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Abstract: 
The handling of the immigration issue by established parties and the electoral success 
of anti-immigrant parties are closely linked. Comparative research on anti-immigrant 
parties argues that articulation of the immigration issue by established parties help 
make anti-immigrant parties electorally viable. The Swedish case seems to challenge 
this view. While there is no successful anti-immigrant party, scholars claim that the 
immigration issue has been a salient issue for established parties at least since the mid 
1990s. However, contradicting this claim, this paper argues that Swedish established 
parties have chosen to not articulate the immigration issue. It first demonstrates 
empirically that the immigration issue has indeed an electoral potential in Sweden. 
Using primary data on election manifestos and televised party leader debates from 
1970 to 2006, it then shows that established parties have downplayed the immigration 
issue in their vote-seeking activities. 
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Introduction 
In countries like Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, and 
Switzerland, the immigration issue has been a vehicle for electorally successful anti-
immigrant parties. However, anti-immigrant parties operating in other West European 
countries have been less successful in exploiting their issue of concern. Scholarly efforts 
to understand variations in the electoral success of anti-immigrant parties identify 
established parties’ handling of their policy agenda as a key causal factor. The basic 
argument is that anti-immigrant parties suffer from an electoral constraint in that they are 
outside the region of acceptability for most voters, and that this electoral constraint is 
lifted when established parties acknowledge their policy agenda (van der Brug et al. 
2005: 555-7; Arzheimer and Carter 2006: 438-9). Thus, by articulating the immigration 
issue, established parties make anti-immigrant parties an acceptable choice for potential 
voters (e.g. Bale 2003: 75; Green-Pedersen and Krogstrup 2008: 613).  
 
While this theory on policy agenda acceptance accounts for the development in countries 
where anti-immigrant parties have been successful, Sweden appears to be the odd case 
out. The lack of success for Swedish anti-immigrant parties is easily observable (Rydgren 
2002). Still, both scholars (Hammar 1999: 179; Green-Pedersen and Odmalm 2008: 373) 
and political pundits (e.g. Bengtsson 2009; Gröning 2009) claim that established parties 
have articulated the immigration issue in their vote-seeking activities, at least since the 
mid 1990s. If their observation is correct, Sweden is a deviant case for policy agenda 
acceptance theory, perhaps because public opinion is less susceptible to anti-immigrant 
rhetoric. 
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However, this paper will argue that the Swedish experience from 1970 to 2006 fits well 
with predictions of the theory. It claims that established parties have chosen to not 
articulate the immigration issue in their vote-seeking activities. We identify two critical 
moments in which established parties came close to acknowledging the policy agenda of 
anti-immigrant parties. The first was when the Conservatives were tempted to articulate 
the immigration issue in the 1994 parliamentary election, but chose not to. The second 
occurred during the 2002 parliamentary election when the Liberals temporarily made the 
immigration issue a main issue in their campaign. To validate our argument  empirically, 
we rely on several data sources, among them a primary data collection of election 
manifestos and televised party leader debates (Esaiasson and Håkansson 2009) and data 
on the policy responsiveness of elected representatives generated by the Swedish 
National Election Studies (SNES) (Holmberg 1994). 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We first develop our theoretical argument 
along with our criteria for parties’ articulation of the immigration issue, and then follow a 
discussion on data and measurements, after which the empirical results are presented. A 
concluding section summarizes our findings and discusses their implications.  
 
The Immigration Issue and Anti-Immigrant Party Success  
We define “the immigration issue” in broad terms to include “regulation of flows of 
immigration and control of aliens” as well as “immigrant policy” (Hammar 1985: 7). 
Regarding the party family of particular interest to us, there is no generally agreed-upon 
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definition. We follow van der Brug et al. (2005: 537) and use the term anti-immigrant 
parties (for other terms, see for example Arzheimer and Carter 2006; Mudde 1996; 
Rydgren 2005). 
 
In comparative research on the electoral fortune of anti-immigrant parties, strategic 
actions of established political parties are considered crucially important (Arzheimer and 
Carter 2006; Green-Pedersen and Krogstrup 2008). One reason why scholars have turned 
to party strategy to explain anti-immigrant party success is that models that focus on 
socio-economic factors fail to account for cross-country variations. Indeed, if socio-
economic factors were the main determinant of electoral success, then we should see 
more successful anti-immigrant parties in Western Europe. Because of this, scholars 
conclude that traditional socio-economic models omit factors that hamper the electoral 
fortune of anti-immigrant parties in some national contexts (van der Brug et al. 2005: 
555-7; Arzheimer and Carter 2006: 438-9). 
 
Specifically, it has been suggested that anti-immigrant parties underperform in some 
countries because potential voter groups do not perceive them as “decent” alternatives 
(van der Brug et al. 2005: 565). In countries where they are evaluated according to the 
same standards as established parties, anti-immigrant parties are much more successful. 
Being seen as a normal – “decent” – alternative is therefore a valuable asset for an anti-
immigrant party (ibid.). 
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A crucial question, then, is how an anti-immigrant party can be transformed into a decent 
political alternative. Scholars have explained this with reference to the actions of 
established parties. Anti-immigrant parties gain decency if their policy proposals are on 
the political agenda which in turn is strongly influenced by the strategic actions of 
established parties. If established parties choose to articulate themes from the anti-
immigrant party’s agenda, it legitimizes the party in the minds of potential voter groups 
(Arzheimer and Carter 2006: 439; Bale 2003: 67).  
 
Moreover, Bale (2003; 2008) argues that parties on the political right have the most to 
gain from moving their agenda closer to the anti-immigrant party agenda, and should 
therefore be the most tempted to do so. In a West European context, mainstream right 
parties have at least two reasons to take policy positions close to anti-immigrant parties. 
First, mainstream right parties traditionally “own” issues often emphasized by anti-
immigrant parties, such as a hard line against immigration, crime and welfare abuse (Bale 
2008: 320). Second, mainstream right parties have a strategic interest in removing “what 
was essentially an artificial constraint on the size of any right bloc in parliament” (Bale 
2003: 69). 
 
It is well known that new issues are not automatically made into political issues in 
parties’ electoral competition (Campbell et al. 1960: chapter 2; Gilljam 1988: chapter 1). 
There are both theoretical and empirical reasons to believe that one important aspect of 
party competition is that of issue competition. With issue competition scholars normally 
denote the competition among parties regarding how salient an issue should be (Carmines 
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and Stimson 1993; see also Budge and Farlie 1983 for a discussion on the similar concept 
of “selective emphasis”). The basic logic of the concept of issue competition is that a 
party tries to get issues that it prefers on the political agenda and issues it dislikes off the 
agenda (Green-Pedersen 2007: 609). Recently, several scholars have claimed that issue 
voting has gained in importance in Western Europe (Thomassen 2005) and thus that issue 
competition has become even more important than before (Carmines and Wagner 2006; 
Green-Pedersen 2007).  
 
Regarding anti-immigrant parties, the immigration issue is the most probable issue 
bridging the legitimacy gap for them and making them an acceptable alternative for large 
voter groups (Bale 2003: 75; Green-Pedersen and Krogstrup 2008: 613). To understand 
the success and failures of anti-immigrant parties it is therefore important to analyze if 
(and to what extent) the immigration issue has been articulated by established parties.  
 
The Swedish Case  
From the perspective of the policy agenda theory, Sweden appears to be a deviant case. 
In sharp contrast to its neighbor countries Denmark and Norway, Sweden has not seen 
any long-lived and nationally successful anti-immigrant party. A separatist party, The 
Skåne Party (Skånepartiet), accomplished to get mandates in local municipalities in the 
Skåne region during the 1980s, but it never had any impact nationally. Another, more 
explicitly xenophobic party, the Sjöbo Party (Sjöbopartiet), originating from one specific 
municipality in Skåne, got some attention in the public debate in 1988 and it managed to 
get 0.5 percent of the votes in the national election and achieved some local 
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representation in Skåne. These parties had, however, only very marginal influence on 
Swedish politics (Rydgren 2002; Widfeldt 2004). 
 
Table 1 reports election results for the two hitherto most successful anti-immigrant 
parties on the national level; New Democracy (Ny demokrati) and the Sweden Democrats 
(Sverigedemokraterna). To contextualize the results, it is important to note the 4 percent 
threshold to the Swedish Parliament. New Democracy was formed just before the 1991 
election. It managed to get 6.7 percent of the national vote and was consequently 
rewarded 25 parliamentary seats (out of 349). However, already in the following election 
its support dropped to 1.2 percent and it disappeared as a serious political alternative 
shortly thereafter. The largest anti-immigrant party today is the Sweden Democrats. It is a 
nationalist oriented party that was formed in 1988. As reported in table 1, they had some 
success in the 2002 and 2006 elections. Although they are still a marginal party, they 
have gained a lot of attention in the Swedish debate after the 2006 election. A dominating 
view today (Winter 2009) is that they have a good chance to get into the Parliament 
following the election in 2010.  
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
Contrary to what comparative research would lead us to expect, it has been claimed by 
both scholars and political pundits that the immigration issue has been salient in Sweden 
at least since the mid 1990s. As Green-Pedersen and Odmalm (2008: 372) put it, the 
immigration issue has: “…gone from being a general welfare state concern, characterized 
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by cross-party consensus, to being an issue used as a way of distinguishing and profiling 
parties”, and they identify the turning point as being the 1994 election (Green-Pedersen 
and Odmalm 2008: 373). The dean of Swedish immigration policy research, Tomas 
Hammar, makes a similar analysis, although he dates the breaking point some years 
earlier, somewhere between the late 1980s and the early 1990s (Hammar 1999: 179). On 
the other hand there are also contradictory claims in the scholarly discussion about the 
salience of the immigration issue in Sweden and this question stands unresolved today 
(Dahlström 2004: 76; Rydgren 2002: 39).  
 
Research strategy and data 
To evaluate empirical support for our argument that Swedish established parties have 
deliberately chosen to not articulate the immigration issue, we proceed in three steps. We 
start by addressing what we consider to be the most probable alternative explanation for 
the absence of successful anti-immigrant parties, namely that the Swedish electorate is 
less susceptible to typical anti-immigration rhetoric. For this purpose we first study party 
elites responsiveness to public opinion on the immigration issue and second whether 
there is an engaged public opinion on the immigration issue for parties to exploit. 
Following this, our third and most important analytical step is to study whether 
established parties have articulated the immigration issue in their vote-seeking activities.  
 
Policy responsiveness of party elites are captured by data from surveys of Members of 
the Parliament and eligible voters carried out by Swedish National Election Studies 
(SNES) (Holmberg 1994; www.valforskning.pol.gu.se).1 Following a parliamentary 
 10
election, both MPs (mail surveys) and eligible voters (personal interviews) are asked 
about their views on an identically worded set of policy proposals including a proposal to 
“accept fewer refugees into the country”. We take the degree of congruence between 
representatives and voters on this issue as an indicator of policy responsiveness; repeated 
and large differences in support of the proposal indicate a low degree of policy 
responsiveness from party elites. 
 
To capture citizens’ engagement in the immigration issue we rely on data from the SOM-
study, a yearly high-quality mail survey with a representative sample of adolescents and 
adults permanently living in Sweden (Holmberg and Weibull 2009; www.som.gu.se). 
Specifically, we focus on responses to an open-ended question which probes subjects to 
identify pressing issues and problems: “What do you think is the most important issue or 
problem facing the country today? Please report up to three issues or problems”. A 
relatively large proportion of references to “immigration” indicate that the immigration 
issue is a concern for citizens.  
 
To capture established parties’ articulation of the immigration issue, we look mainly at 
the issue content of explicit campaign messages. Here we rely on primary data from the 
so-called POP-study, which is a systematic quantitative content analysis of campaign 
messages in manifestos and televised party leader debates (Esaiasson and Håkansson 
2009). In a complementary analysis, we look at voters’ perceptions about parties 
campaign messages using data from SNES voter studies (Oscarsson and Holmberg 2008; 
www.valforskning.pol.gu.se).  
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Policy Responsiveness  
By comparative standards, Swedish citizens are often classified as tolerant towards 
foreigners (Hjerm 2007). This suggests that Swedish public opinion might be less 
susceptible to the rhetoric typically associated with anti-immigration parties. However, 
notwithstanding relatively high levels of tolerance, measures of attitudes towards specific 
policy proposals show that a large proportion of the general public supports more 
restrictive immigration policies in Sweden. More specifically, the estimated proportion of 
citizens that favor a proposal to “allow fewer refugees into the country” has since 1990 
varied between 65 and 43 percent. Moreover, when the wordings of the policy proposal 
are reversed so that a favorable response indicates a support of a generous immigration 
policy, the proportion of favorable responses decreases to around 20 percent (Demker 
2009: 49). Hence, the rather dramatic marginal distributions on the policy proposals in 
question cannot reasonably be written off as a statistical artifact.  
 
How have party elites responded to this anti-immigration opinion? To answer this 
question, Figure 1 displays the percentage difference between MPs’ and citizens’ support 
for the proposal to “accept fewer refugees into the country” in the aftermath of 
parliamentary elections between 1994 and 2006. High percentages indicate large policy 
disagreement. As points of reference we use the average level of disagreement over a 
large set of policy proposals (excluding “accept fewer refugees”) and a policy proposal 
that reflects the dominating ideological left-right conflict “to reduce the scope of the 
public sector”.2 
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[Figure 1 about here] 
 
Results show a persistent and substantially large level of disagreement between MPs and 
citizens on the proposal to accept fewer refugees into the country. As expected, MPs hold 
a negative view on the proposal, whereas citizens are much more supportive. The level of 
disagreement is three to four times higher than the average level of disagreement over the 
entire set of policy proposals included in the surveys as well as the typical left-right issue 
to “reduce the scope of the public sector”. Taking all policy proposals in the surveys into 
account, disagreement over “immigration” is clearly larger than for any other policy 
proposal in 1994, 1998, and 2002, and the second largest in 2006 (beaten only by a 
proposal to allow Turkey into the EU).  
 
In 2006, the level of policy disagreement decreases somewhat (the difference is down 
from 50 to 40 percentage points). However, for our purpose it is important to note that 
this is because citizens express more liberal views on immigration than before (support 
for the proposal to allow fewer refugees into the country decreases from 57 to 48 
percent).  In other words, it is citizen opinion that moves closer to MP opinion, rather 
than MPs adjusting to citizen opinion. 
 
Overall, in support of our argument that established parties have deliberately chosen to 
not exploit the immigration issue, the results presented here suggest that party elites have 
remained unresponsive to anti-immigrant policy views among citizens.  
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Electoral Potential  
Another alternative related to the Swedish public opinion is that citizens consider 
“immigration” a peripheral issue. As a measure of citizens’ engagement, Figure 2 shows 
the proportion of citizens in the SOM-surveys that have answered “immigration” when 
asked an open-ended survey question about the “the most important problem facing the 
country today”. To provide some points of reference, we include corresponding 
information about “the environmental issue” and about the issue which is mentioned by 
most respondents each year (what we denote the “main issue”). We also include 
information about the rank order of “immigration” on a list of 17 issues and problems.3 
 
[Figure 2 about here] 
 
Results indicate that “immigration” is a concern for citizens. Each year a substantial 
proportion of respondents (ranging from 7 to 25 percent) identifies “immigration” as one 
of the most important problems facing the country. In terms of rank order, “immigration” 
consistently scores among the top third of important problems facing the country. It is not 
a prime concern for citizens – not in any year is “immigration” identified as the main 
problem facing the country – but from the mid 1990s it has been relatively more 
engaging than “the environment”. Overall the results suggest that there is a potential 
engagement in the immigration issue to explore for political parties; Swedish public 
opinion is hardly exceptional in comparison to countries in which anti-immigrant parties 
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have used the immigration issue as a springboard for electoral success (Arzheimer and 
Carter 2006; Bale 2003).   
 
While citizen engagement in the immigration issue appears to be relatively stable over 
time, the early 1990s stands out as a deviant period. For two consecutive years, in 1992 
and 1993, “immigration” was considered to be among the top three most important 
problems facing the country. These were years when Sweden received an unusually large 
influx of refugees from the war-torn former Yugoslavia (Dahlström 2004: 50-5) and also 
experienced violent actions against refugee centers and individual immigrants (Lodenius 
and Larsson 1994), while at the same time being hit by an exceptional economic 
recession with drastic cutbacks in welfare state systems (Andersen 2001; Lindvall 2004). 
Beginning in the election year of 1994, citizen engagement returned to a lower level 
(although higher than before the crisis years).  
 
The Immigration Issue in Election Campaigns 
In this section we study established parties’ articulation of the immigration issue in their 
vote-seeking activities during election campaigns from 1970 to 2006. Figure 3 reports the 
proportion of the election manifestos from the established parties that have been 
dedicated to the immigration issue. Again, the environment issue and the main issue (that 
is the issue that gains the most attention) for each election are included as points of 
reference.   
 
[Figure 3 about here] 
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As is evident in Figure 3, a very small proportion of the election manifestos are dedicated 
to the immigration issue. In the election manifestos from 1970 to 2006, between 0 and 4 
percent of the content are related to the immigration issue. This can be compared with the 
environment issue, another new issue, which varies from 2 to 10 percent. With the 
exception of the environment issue in the 1988 election, none of the two issues come 
close to being the main issue in any election campaign. At the most, the immigration 
issue is allotted a third of the space compared to the main issue. 
 
Looking at the entire time period, an initially small increase can be seen in the election of 
1988, when 2 percent of the manifestos were devoted to the immigration issue. This level 
is stable through the 1991 election, but drops to 1 percent in 1994 and stays at that level 
in the 1998 election. The immigration issue has its highest scores in the elections of 2002 
and 2006, when 4 percent of the content in the manifestos were devoted to this issue. 
Generally, the data from the manifestos supports the view that the established parties 
have not articulated the immigration issue.  
 
The election manifestos do however only capture the messages that the parties had 
drafted before the campaign. To get an indication of whether the immigration issue was 
articulated during the campaign itself, figure 4 reports on the proportion of time dedicated 
to the issue in the televised party leader debate broadcasted just before the Election Day. 
If “immigration” emerged as an issue during the campaign, either the parties or the 
journalists are likely to bring it up in this final debate. 
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[Figure 4 about here] 
 
Again, the general picture is one of little attention being paid to the immigration issue. 
The proportion of time dedicated to the immigration issue is generally between 0 and 8 
percent, and if the 2002 election is excluded it is between 0 and 4 percent. Up to the 1991 
election the immigration issue was almost never brought up at all in the party leader 
debate, and if it was included, then it was only to a very small extent (1 percent). In all 
elections before 1998, the environment issue was dedicated more time than the 
immigration issue and in the 1998 election the same time was devoted to the two issues.  
 
There are, however, two important exceptions from the general pattern. The first occurs 
in the 1994 debate. Although it is still on a fairly low level, the attention paid to the 
immigration issue increases from 1 to 4 percent. This reflects how leaders of the 
established parties responded to the explicit anti-immigrant statements made by the new 
leader of New Democracy, Vivian Franzén. We will discuss this period in more detail 
below since it has been identified as a critical period by scholars (Green-Pedersen and 
Odmalm 2008; Hammar 1999).4  
 
The largest diversion from the general pattern is the party leader debate in the 2002 
election. This is the only time when more attention has been paid to the immigration issue 
than to the environment issue, and what is more, in the 2002 election the immigration 
issue took up about half the time as the main issue. Since the 2002 election stands out 
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regarding the attention paid to the immigrant issue, we will discuss this election and the 
period between 2002 and 2006 in more detail in the next section. Here it is enough to 
note that the reason for the high scores in the 2002 election is a specific policy proposal 
from the Liberals that was made late in the election campaign and that the immigration 
issue was pushed only by the Liberals.  
 
There are two important limitations to our main indicators of parties’ articulation of the 
immigrant issue. First, although we maintain that manifestos and party leader debates are 
important channels for party communication, there are other forums where parties can 
communicate with their voters (Naurin 2009). Second, they only capture explicit 
campaign messages from the parties. Obviously parties sometimes use other means, such 
as implicit strategies, to communicate sensitive matters to voters (Gilens 1999; Federico 
2004). Therefore, figure 5 reports on voters’ perceptions of the parties’ primary campaign 
issues.  
 
[Figure 5 about here] 
 
As before, the environment issue and the main issue are included as points of reference. 
The time period covered in figure 5 is from 1982 to 2006, and it draws on an open-ended 
question from the SNES voter studies. Respondents are asked about what issues each 
party has emphasized the most during the election campaign (Oscarsson and Holmberg 
2008: 52). From 1982 to 1988 no one (0 percent) saw the immigration issue as an 
important issue for any of the established parties. This changed in the 1991 election, 
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when the proportion rose to 10 percent for the Liberal party, but then it dropped back to 3 
percent in 1994 and to 0 percent in 1998. The relatively high value in 1991 is explained 
by the Liberals’ critique against the anti-immigration policies suggested by New 
Democracy, which motivated some voters to perceive the immigration issue as a primary 
issue for the Liberals. During all years up until the 2002 election, the immigration issue 
was far behind the environment issue and it never came close to being the main issue. 
 
The 2002 election is again an exception; 56 percent of the respondents perceived the 
immigration issue as an important issue for at least one of the established parties. This is 
the only time when “immigration” scores higher than any other issue including the 
environment. However, the high value for the immigration issue in the 2002 election can 
be attributed solely to voters’ perceptions about the Liberals. This also illustrates how 
sensitive the perception indicator is, as it captures all important issues for any of the 
established political parties.  
 
Importantly, our indicators of party leader debate and the voters’ perceptions show a 
sharp drop in terms of the attention paid to the immigration issue already in the following 
election of 2006. We will discuss the 2002 election further in the next section.  
 
Overall, the results presented here support our argument that the established parties have 
chosen not to systematically articulate the immigration issue in their vote-seeking 
activities.  
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Two Critical Periods, 1991-1994 and 2002-2006 
We will finally turn to the two critical periods during which the immigration issue has 
had its highest scores of articulation from the established parties; 1991 to 1994 and 2002 
to 2006.  
 
Regarding the former period, it has been argued that the immigration issue was 
articulated in the early 1990s, since established parties adapted to the electoral success of 
New Democracy in the 1991 parliamentary election (Green-Pedersen and Odmalm 2008: 
373-4; Hammar 1999: 179). We agree that the early 1990s was a critical period for the 
immigration issue in political discourse – Figure 2 above illustrates how citizen 
engagement rose rapidly in 1992 and 1993 – but we argue that established parties acted to 
keep the issue away from the public agenda.  
 
Before analysing the actions of the established parties in the 1991-1994 period, it is 
important to recognise that New Democracy primarily ran their 1991 campaign on a 
broad anti-establishment agenda. True, the anti-immigration rhetoric was a part of their 
campaign, but it was not their main message in 1991 (Rydgren 2002: 33-34). This is 
supported by the data reported in Table 2. The immigration issue did not play the leading 
role for New Democracy in their vote-seeking activities in 1991. On all three indicators 
immigration was far behind the main issue which was high taxes along with bureaucratic 
inefficiency. Only in their bid for re-election in 1994 did the immigration issue emerge as 
the main issue for New Democracy.  
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[Table 2 about here] 
 
However, rather than adapting to an anti-immigration rhetoric which might have played 
well with the policy moods among substantial groups of voters, established parties 
unanimously denounced New Democracy in 1994. In a rare manifestation of unity in the 
televised debate shortly before Election Day, representatives of all established parties 
made it clear that immigration was a non-issue for them: “Shameful”, “despicable”, 
“immoral” were some adjectives used to characterize New Democracy policy proposals 
(Dahlström 2004: 76-78). Apart from this demonstration, the immigration issue was not 
articulated at all by established parties in the 1994 party leader debate.  
 
According to policy agenda acceptance theory, actions of mainstream right parties are 
particularly important as they stand the most to gain from articulating the immigration 
issue (Bale 2003: 69). Considering this, it is surprising that the Conservative Prime 
Minister at the time, Carl Bildt, joined the other party leaders in dissociating himself and 
his party from the anti-immigration rhetoric of New Democracy. This is even more 
surprising when we take a closer look at the data on policy responsiveness, as it indicates 
that the Conservatives did indeed differ from other established parties in 1994. Table 3 
gives detailed information about the level of policy agreement on the proposal to allow 
fewer refugees into the country between MPs and their party voters for all parties in the 
Swedish Parliament in 1994 and 1998.  
 
[Table 3 about here] 
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In 1994, Conservative MPs were in close agreement with their voters on favouring more 
restrictive immigration policies. This is the only occasion during the entire study period 
from 1994 to 2006 that a party has been in agreement with their voters on this particular 
proposal.5 In 1998, Conservative MPs had again adjusted their views to other party elites 
and thereby distancing themselves from their voters. To take a contrasting example, 
Social democratic MPs, who ran the risk of losing substantially to radical anti-immigrant 
parties, responded quite differently to the situation. While a majority of Social democratic 
voters consistently favoured the proposal to accept fewer refugees into the country, the 
vast majority of MPs took the opposite view in both 1994 and 1998. These results suggest 
that the Conservative party leadership did not have the full backing of their parliamentary 
party group when they chose to not articulate the immigration issue in the 1994 election. 
Providing support for the view that the early 1990s was a critical period for Swedish 
debate, the Conservative party was probably tempted to start articulating the immigration 
issue. 
 
Turning to the second critical period, 2002 to 2006, the political context differs quite 
radically from the crisis ridden period between 1991 and 1994. The Swedish economy 
was in much better shape; the level of unemployment was relatively low (SCB 2005) and 
public support for a more restrictive immigration policy was less widespread than in the 
early 1990s (Demker 2009, 49). In spite of this, the election of 2002 is the one election 
that differs the most from the general pattern reported in the previous section, in 
 22
particular with regard to the party leader debate and voters’ perceptions about campaign 
messages.  
 
The main reason why the 2002 election is exceptional is that a specific policy proposal to 
introduce a language test as a requirement for naturalization was brought to the campaign 
by the Liberals (Boréus 2006: 134). This policy proposal  came in rather late in the 
campaign, but grew in importance, fueled by the harsh critique from the Social 
Democrats, the Left Party (Vänsterpartiet), and the Greens (Miljöpartiet), together with 
massive media attention (Boréus 2006: 133-4; Holmberg and Oscarsson 2004: 123-4). 
The Conservatives had actually made a similar but less advertised proposition in the 
parliament before the election campaign, and they also expressed some interest in the 
issue during the final weeks of the campaign. As is evident from Table 4, the 
Conservatives did not communicate its message to the voters since only 2 percent of the 
respondents saw the immigrant issue as an important issue for the Conservatives in the 
2002 election, compared to 56 percent for the Liberals. Overall, it is thus clear that the 
Liberals articulated the immigration issue in the 2002 campaign and voters obviously got 
the message. With regard to voters’ perceptions, the party scoring second after the 
Liberals’ 56 percent was the Social democrats with 5 percent. 
 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
Turning to the election manifestos, the Liberals put the most emphasis on the 
immigration issue out of the established parties, but the levels were still quite low. 
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Compared to the main issue reported in figure 3, it made up about a third. However, as 
indicated by the detailed results presented in Table 4, it is also clear that the Liberals did 
not push the immigration issue in the party leader debate. This might indicate that the 
Liberals tried to turn down its articulation of the immigration issue during the end of the 
campaign. Instead, the highest figure in the party leader debate came from the opponents 
of the language test. Regarding the immigration issue, the most active party in the party 
leader debate was the Greens followed by the Left party, who both took the opportunity 
to denounce the Liberals’ policy proposals in terms that were similar to the unique, 
unanimous action in the 1994 debate.  
 
For the purpose of this paper it is even more important to note that the attention paid to 
the immigration issue dropped sharply already in the following 2006 election. In the 
televised party leader debate no party mentioned the immigration issue (0 percent), and 
according to voters’ perceptions only the Liberals articulated the immigration issue 
during the election campaign and it did so much less clearly than in 2002. As reported in 
table 4, 18 percent of the respondents perceived the immigration issue to be important for 
the Liberals, while the figures for the other established parties are extremely low 
(between 0 and 1 percent). In the party leader debate of 2006 almost no time was 
dedicated to the immigrant issue. It would thus appear that the established parties 
returned to their previous decision to not articulate “immigration” in their vote-seeking 
activities.  
 
 24
Conclusion 
This paper has argued that the established political parties in Sweden have deliberately 
chosen to not articulate the immigration issue in their vote-seeking activities. We make 
this claim in contrast to previous scholars who have argued that the immigration issue 
became an “issue used as a way of distinguishing and profiling parties” in Sweden in the 
mid 1990s (Green-Pedersen and Odmalm 2008: 372; see also Hammar 1999: 179, for 
similar statements).  
 
Empirically, the paper first demonstrates that the immigration issue has indeed an 
electoral potential in Sweden. The gap between policy preferences of voters and Swedish 
MPs in the immigration issue is large and persistent (Holmberg 1996; 2002; 2004; 2010). 
What is more, the immigration issue has generally scored among the top third of the most 
important problems facing the country between 1987 and 2008 (Holmberg and Weibull 
2009: 12-3). Using original data from quantitative analyses of the issue content of 
election manifestos and televised party leader debates, the paper then empirically 
contradicts the claim that the immigration issue has been articulated by the established 
parties during election campaigns. Generally, the immigration issue has not been 
articulated by the established parties between 1970 and 2006. 
 
The most important exception from this pattern is found late in the studied period, 
namely in the 2002 election. During the campaign the Liberals made a policy proposal to 
introduce a language test as a requirement for naturalization, which was enough to bring 
the immigration issue into the campaign. This exception demonstrates that it is indeed 
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possible to make politics out of the immigration issue and, at least speculatively, that 
something might be on the way to happen with the immigration issue in Sweden. 
Speaking against this speculation is, however, that the saliency of the immigration issue 
dropped sharply already in the following 2006 election. 
 
Our findings fit well with policy agenda acceptance theory on anti-immigrant party 
success. In a comparative West European context it has been shown that the actions of 
established political parties are crucially important for the success of anti-immigrant 
parties. If the established parties’ prime issues are from the anti-immigrant party agenda, 
then this will legitimize the anti-immigrant party and thus make more voters inclined to 
actually vote for it (Arzheimer and Carter 2006: 439). Based on this comparative research 
and on the findings in this paper, it is probable that the established parties’ decision not to 
articulate the immigration issue has contributed to the general failures of anti-immigrant 
parties in Sweden.   
 
Our findings are not only important for political science theory, but have also important 
political implication. Currently, Swedish political pundits often advise established parties 
to bring the immigration issue into the political debate as a way of hindering the growing 
anti-immigrant party, the Sweden Democrats. According to this paper, such advice rests 
on false premises about the experience during the study period. 
 
If the established parties whish to hamper the growth of the Sweden Democrats, an 
advice more in line with the results in this paper is to avoid to articulate the immigration 
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issue. Elisabeth Ivarsflaten (2005) has argued that anti-immigrant parties are vulnerable 
to the salience of the economic dimension, since they are supported by a combination of 
voters with radically different preferences for state intervention in the economy (blue-
collar workers and owners of small businesses). Combining these two observations, we 
would instead offer the following advice to established parties — “When they say 
immigration, you say the economy!” 
 
But, what would be the consequences of such a strategy be? It is probable that the large 
policy disagreements between voters and MPs that we observe to some extent can be 
explained by the fact that the immigration issue has not been discussed among the 
political parties in Sweden. Generally, the gap between policy positions tends to be 
smaller in salient issues. Persistent policy disagreement between citizens and 
representatives is, of course, not good for legitimacy of the representative democratic 
system. From this perspective, the established parties’ handling of the immigration issue 
is a problem for the democratic system in Sweden. However, while reflecting over the 
low degree of responsiveness of the representative system it is also important to note 
insights from the issue competition literature (Carmines and Wagner 2006; Green-
Pedersen 2007). If they are right, and issue competition is of significant and growing 
importance, the immigration issue is only one of many potential issues suppressed by the 
established parties. Indeed, policy disagreement between voters and their representatives 
in some issues may be an unavoidable element of modern party competition.  
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Tables and Figures 
 
Figure 1 
Level of policy disagreement between MPs and adult citizens 1994-2006 
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Percent supporting “Fewer refugees” 
MPs/Citizens      17/70                     9/61                      7/57                    8/48   
 
Comment: Difference in percentage points between MPs and adult citizens regarding policy proposals 
(very and rather good). 
Source: Holmberg (1996; 2002; 2004; 2010).
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Figure 2 
Most important problem facing country, 1987-2006 
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Ranking     8     9      7     4     7     3    3    6     6     5    6     9    6     6    5     4     6    6    6     5 
out of 17 
Comment: Percentage of the respondents naming immigration and the environment as the most important 
issues for Sweden today. The environment and the main issue are included as points of reference. From 
1987 to 1990 the environment was the main issue. 
Source: Holmberg and Weibull (2009), 12-13.  
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Figure 3 
Policy issues in Election Manifestos, 1970-2006. 
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Comment: Percentage of election manifestos dedicated to environment and immigration issues. The main 
issue is included as a point of reference. 
Source: Esaiasson and Håkansson (2009). 
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Figure 4 
Policy issues in the televised party leader debate before the election, 1970-2006 
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Comment: Percentage of time of the televised party leader debate dedicated to environment and 
immigration issues. The main issue is included as a point of reference. 
Source: Esaiasson and Håkansson (2009). 
 
 31
Figure 5 
Voters’ perception of parties’ primary issues for any political party in the election campaign, 1982-
2006. 
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Comment: Percentage of voters perceiving environment and immigration issues as major issues for any 
political party in the election campaign. The main issue is included as a point of reference. From 1988 to 
1994 the environment was the main issue, and for 2002 the immigration issue was the main issue.  
Source: Gilljam and Holmberg (1990; 1993; 1995); Holmberg (1984; 2000); Holmberg and Gilljam 
(1987); Holmberg and Oscarsson (2004); Oscarsson and Holmberg (2008). 
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Table 1 
Election results in percentage of votes for New democracy and the Sweden Democrats, 1988-2006 
 1988 1991 1994 1998 2002 2006 
 
New Democracy 
      
National elections -- 6.7 1.2 0.2 -- -- 
Local elections -- 3.4 1.1 Missing -- -- 
 
The Sweden Democrats 
      
National elections 0.0* 0.1* 0.2* 0.4 1.4 2.9 
Local elections Missing Missing Missing Missing 0.9 2.9 
Comment: The Sweden Democrats was founded in 1988 and New Democracy was founded in 1991.  
* The 1988, 1991 and 1994 election results are rough estimates, based on self reported results from the 
Sweden Democrats. 
Source: Statistics Sweden and The Election Authority.
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Table 2 
New Democracy and the Immigration Issue (percent) 
 Manifestoes Party leader debates Perceived importance  
 1991 1994 1991 1994 1991 1994 
 
Immigration 
 
4 
 
10 
 
8 
 
44 
 
9 
 
29 
 
Environment 
 
5 
 
5 
 
2 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
Main Issue 
 
16 
 
10 
 
17 
 
44 
 
21 
 
29 
Comment: The table shows the New Democracy articulation of the immigrant issue in the 1991 and 1994 
election campaigns. 
Source: Esaiasson and Håkansson (2009) (Manifestoes and Party Leader debates); Gilljam and Holmberg 
1993, 1995 (perceived  importance of campaign messages). 
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Table 3  
Agreement between members of Parliament and their respective voters on a policy proposal to 
accept fewer refugees into the country (percent). 
  
1994 
 
1998 
 MPs Voters Difference MPs Voters Difference 
Left Party 0 51 -51 0 54 -54 
Greens 0 40 -40 0 41 -41 
Social-Democrats 9 75 -66 4 63 -59 
Center party 6 74 -68 17 58 -41 
Liberals 0 43 -43 0 30 -30 
Conservatives 74 78 -4 28 71 -43 
Christian-Democrats 0 56 -56 6 58 52 
Source: Holmberg (1996; 2002). 
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Table 4 
Established Parties and the Immigration Issue 2002 and 2006 (percent) 
  
Manifestoes 
 
Party Leader debates 
 
Perceived importance  
  
2002 
 
2006 
 
2002 
 
2006 
 
2002 
 
2006 
 
Left Party 
 
3 
 
3 
 
8 
 
0 
 
3 
 
1 
 
Social-Democrats 
 
3 
 
3 
 
4 
 
0 
 
5 
 
1 
 
Greens 
 
4 
 
6 
 
15 
 
0 
 
0 
 
1 
 
Center Party  
 
5 
 
3 
 
4 
 
1 
 
1 
 
0 
 
Liberals 
 
6 
 
6 
 
5 
 
0 
 
56 
 
18 
 
Conservatives 
 
2 
 
5 
 
8 
 
0 
 
2 
 
0 
 
Christian Democrats 
 
1 
 
3 
 
8 
 
0 
 
1 
 
0 
Source: Esaiasson and Håkansson 2009 (Manifestoes and Televised debates); Holmberg and Oscarsson  
2004; Oscarsson and Holmberg 2008 (perceived  importance of campaign messages). 
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Notes 
                                                 
1 The response rate of the Riksdag surveys, which have been conducted regularly since 1985, are over 90 
percent among the 349 MPs. Principal investigators are Sören Holmberg (1985-2006), Peter Esaiasson 
(1985-1994) and Martin Brothén (1994-2006). Study details are found in Brothén (2003, 2007). 
2 The number of policy proposals that are included in the SNES-studies varies somewhat over the years: 20 
(1994); 12 (1998); 17 (2002); 19 (2006). Eight proposals have been included in all four studies. 
3 Additionally, the following issues  and problems are identified in the SOM-surveys: Health care; 
Employment; the Environment; the Educational system; the Economy; Pensions and Elderly Care; Law and 
order; Social insurances; Taxes; Family politics; Transports; Moral issues; Energy issues; Public 
sector/privatization; Agriculture; and The European Union. 
4 If New Democracy is also included in our coding of the party debate the proportion dedicated to the 
immigration issue would increase to 10 percent, ranking third of all issues in that debate.  
5 Unfortunately for the purpose of this study, but indirectly in support of our argument that immigration has 
been a non-salient issue, the 1994 Riksdag survey was the first to ask participants about this policy 
proposal. 
